Home Invasion Search Warrant: Two Knocks is One Too Many

April 20, 2017

Screen Shot 2017-04-20 at 12.02.57 PM(United States v. Juan Olaya, D-2, Case No. 15-cr-20200, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION)

On December 5, 2014 a group of 6 that was attached to a spree of home invasions was finally broken after arrests were made in a home-invasion in Flower Mound, TX. The group was attributed to home invasions in New Jersey, Michigan, and Texas and charges varied from federal racketeering to weapons, kidnapping and violent assault.

In Texas, one of the group’s members left a cell phone in a vehicle that was found to be associated with the crimes. According to court documents (linked below), Texas’ officer Mark Esparza obtained a warrant to examine the Samsung phone and photo documented a number of text messages and other evidence related to the crimes. The phone did not, however, have a full forensic acquisition.  After photo documenting the evidentiary information, officer Esparza returned the warrant. Nine months after Esparza’s search, the FBI, without obtaining a new warrant, searched the cell phone again and this time they did a full forensic acquisition of the phone.

This final acquisition of the phone brought the number of searches of the phone to three: Pre-warrant search for IMEI and phone number, warranted search for the phone evidence, and Federal search through the acquired phone image. Presumably, the search through a forensically acquired phone would yield additional information, and reading between the lines I am guessing this was the case for the evidentiary Samsung phone. Certainly it would assist in authenticating the evidence.

Defendant Jaun Olaya, the owner of the phone and one of the group members charged, moved to suppress the results of all three searches.  Mr. Olaya argued that “even if the screenshots that Esparza obtained should not be suppressed, the results of the more comprehensive FBI search should be.” On 4/19/2017 the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division court agreed with Olaya: The FBI’s acquisition of the phone and subsequent search was found to be warrantless and a violation of Olaya’s 4th amendment.  Pages 14 through to the end of the Court’s opinion and order contain the Court’s reasoning on this point.

What would be interesting to me (and potentially to criminal defense attorneys) is whether the same logic of the court could be applied if officer Esparza HAD done a full forensic acquisition of Olaya’s phone: Under those conditions, would the government’s use of Esparza’s acquisition required a second warrant?  The fact is, there is a lot of data in a phone acquisition that has nothing to do with specific crimes so I am guessing that the argument could be made.  If any criminal attorneys know of some good cases to answer the question, feel free to post below!

 

United States v. Juan Olaya, D-2, Case No. 15-cr-20200, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

 

 


Texas CoA Addresses Electronic Community Property and Invasion of Privacy

August 5, 2016

Reference:

Miller v. Talley Dunn Gallery LLC, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2280

(Tex. App. – Dallas March 3, 2016) (mem. opinion)

(Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV)

Relevant Documents:

Memorandum Opinion:  March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV

Texas Penal Code 33

In this case, part of the original trial court’s decision determined that Talley Dunn and the Tally Dunn Gallery LLC had “established a probable right to recover on their claims under the HACA. [Harmful Access to Computers Act]”  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 19]

In his appeal, Bradley B. Miller argues that, while he admits that he took screenshots of information contained on the phone, the screenshots do not qualify as “access” and that he had effective consent to do so because the cell phone was community property.  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 21-22]

Texas Penal Code § 33.01(1) defines access as:

“to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, alter data or computer software in, or otherwise make use of any resource of a computer, computer network, computer program, or computer system.”

Neither party disputes that a cell phone is a computer, and the appellate court found that in order to take the screen shots Miller necessarily HAD to access the the computing device, within the definition of the penal code.  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 22]

Regarding his argument that he had effective consent to access the cell phone because it was community property, the CoA relied upon the penal code definition of ‘owner’ as:

“a person who:

(A) has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor;

(B) has the right to restrict access to the property; or

(C) is the licensee of data or computer software.”

Dunn used the cell phone on a daily basis, had the right to place a password on it (and had), and the court determined Dunn had a ‘greater right to possession of the cell phone’.[March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 23]  Further, the CoA notes earlier in the opinion that “[N]othing in the Texas Constitution or our common law suggests that the right of privacy is limited to unmarried individuals.”  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 20]

Interestingly, the court does not address the multiple licenses that are part of the software and operating system that users have to acknowledge and accept to use a modern cell phone.  I would expect that will start coming up as another layer to the definition of ‘owner’, though.

Accordingly, the CoA concludes that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining appellees established a probable right to recover on their claims under the HACA.”  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 23]


Weekly Highlights: September 10, 2012

September 10, 2012

Things You Might Have Missed Last Week

(Highlights in legal and electronic discovery news for the past week)

Interesting Electronic Evidence Cases

Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00127-PK (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012)

The defendant was seeking to compel production of discovery in (among other things) “all social media content involving [Plaintiff] since July 1, 2008” related to the Plaintiff’s “‘emotion, feeling, or mental state,’ to ‘events that could be reasonably expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state,’ or to allegations in [Plaintiff’s] complaint.”.

Magistrate Judge Paul Papak (Oregon) found:

“I see no principled reason to articulate different standards for the discoverability of communications through email, text message, or social media platforms. I therefore fashion a single order covering all these communications.”

Link to Opinion PDF

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. C 11-1846 LHK (PSG) (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012)

The Defendant in this case was sanctioned for the loss of relevant emails due to Defendant’s failure to follow-up with employees to ensure compliance, and the Defendant’s failure to halt the email system’s auto-delete function.  Sanctions included an adverse inference that allowed the jury to presume that the missing evidence was relevant and favorable to the Plaintiff.

Link to Opinion PDF

Weekly Highlighted Case

EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430 (S.D. Ind. May 2010)

This case can be very useful when dealing with social media electronic evidence matters.  It was utilized by the Oregon magistrate in the above listed case (Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas) when forming his opinion.

The defendant in this matter was seeking production of claimants’ social networking site profiles, as well as other communications from social sites used by the claimant.

Last May, the Great State of Texas saw a similar matter that relied, in part, on the EEOC case:

IN RE MAGELLAN TERMINALS HOLDINGS, L.P. AND MAGELLAN MIDSTREAM HOLDINGS GP, LLC 
Link to PDF Document

Electronic Evidence News

State Bar of Texas Alert Says ‘Scam Artist’ Stole Nonpracticing Lawyer’s ID for Fake Website

West Let Off the Hook on Web Malpractice Claim

OJ Simpson Prosecutor: Johnnie Cochran May Have Tampered with Bloody Glove


Kwame Kilpatrick Asks Skytel for $100M

March 10, 2009

It is being reported that Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick is going after Skytel for the release of the text messages that led to the settlement of the police whistleblower lawsuit against him.

(source: The Detroit News)

It appears that the grounds for this action is the Stored Communications Act.  As a non-attorney I am guessing that this will boil down to a few factors:

  1. Was the police department involved in the production of the text messages (4th amendment),
  2. Was the contract with Skytel to provide messaging services, or storage/retrieval and reporting?

The Stored Communication Act does differentiate between a provider of services, and a provider of storage, so the Skytel contract wording will likely make a difference.

With all of the Kwame Drama aside, this could actually be interesting for providers, contract attorneys, e-discovery and forensics folks as well.

Here is a reference to another case with similar characteristics:

Quon v. Arch Wireless


Quon v. Arch Wireless Lesson: Pay Attention to Policy and Procedure

July 9, 2008

Case: Quon v. Arch Wireless

Case Link:  0755282 Quon v. Arch Wireless Opinion

Editorial:

Much is being made about this case and the supposed impact Quon v Arch Wireless has on the ability for employers to review employee communications. I am a bit surprised by the reaction to the case, and it makes me wonder if the people responding to this case have actually read the opinion.

The Court’s opinion is actually very well considered and very focused in scope.  I tend to file this one under the failure of an organization to properly maintain, communicate and apply policy and procedure consistently. When I read the Court’s opinion I came away with the very distinct impression that if Ontario had done these things properly there would have been no case.

Having said that, I think this case is worthy of notice because of the illustration it gives corporate (and other) entities of the need for solid policy and procedure. In addition there were several cases relied upon (in the “Resources” section) that provide an instructive backdrop to this opinion.

Summary:

The Ontario police department ordered a review of text messages sent and received by one of its officers.

The text messages were ordered from Arch Wireless Operating Company – a third party provider contracted to carry the text messages.

The review was ordered to determine if pagers were being used for work related usage only.

The review of Quon’s transmissions stemmed from overages that incurred cost to the department. The review was ordered to determine if the pager plan needed to be increased because work related usage had increased.

The City had policy and procedure governing appropriate use of computers and “associated equipment” but had no specific policy directed at wireless pager communication.

There were conflicting recollections as to when, how and if notification that the pager transmissions were subject to review had been made.

The department could not access the text messages themselves, but rather through a contact at Arch Wireless.

It was found that many of the messages sent by Quon were sexually explicit and not work related.

Quon had gone over the limit three or four times before the review was done. Each time he simply paid the overage charge and no review of text messages was performed.

Issues:

The court further considered whether the rights of not just the officer (Quon) but also the rights of those he texted had been violated.

At issue was the reasonable-ness of the review conducted (was it just to determine misconduct, or was it to determine a need to expand the service) as well as the role that the wireless carrier played (ECS or RCS) and whether that violated the Stored Communications Act by turning over the messages to its subscriber (the City).

While the reason for the review was to be considered the methods to perform that review were also at issue.

Also at Issue was whether proper notification had been given that the communications could be reviewed.

The Court considered whether Fourth amendment rights were violated in light of the “informal” policy the department had towards text messaging.

Interesting Points:

Had the department simply used the “To and From” in their review there would likely have been no problem.

If there had been a more explicit policy to inform the employee that Text messages had no reasonable expectation of privacy there likely would have been no grounds for Quon’s claims.

Part of the policy issue was related to inconsistent application of that policy – There was an expectation that if the overages were paid that there would be no review. Quon had exceeded the limit three or four times and had paid for the overages and there was no review.

The court found that Fourth Amendment privacy rights had been violated. This was because the search, while reasonable in its purpose (to determine whether the business plan needed to be increased) was not reasonable in its scope. The Court found that there were many other methods that could have been used that would not have violated Quon’s expectation of privacy.

Resources:

Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701-2711 (1986)

Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004)

United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008)

United States v. Heckencamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007)