Home Invasion Search Warrant: Two Knocks is One Too Many

April 20, 2017

Screen Shot 2017-04-20 at 12.02.57 PM(United States v. Juan Olaya, D-2, Case No. 15-cr-20200, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION)

On December 5, 2014 a group of 6 that was attached to a spree of home invasions was finally broken after arrests were made in a home-invasion in Flower Mound, TX. The group was attributed to home invasions in New Jersey, Michigan, and Texas and charges varied from federal racketeering to weapons, kidnapping and violent assault.

In Texas, one of the group’s members left a cell phone in a vehicle that was found to be associated with the crimes. According to court documents (linked below), Texas’ officer Mark Esparza obtained a warrant to examine the Samsung phone and photo documented a number of text messages and other evidence related to the crimes. The phone did not, however, have a full forensic acquisition.  After photo documenting the evidentiary information, officer Esparza returned the warrant. Nine months after Esparza’s search, the FBI, without obtaining a new warrant, searched the cell phone again and this time they did a full forensic acquisition of the phone.

This final acquisition of the phone brought the number of searches of the phone to three: Pre-warrant search for IMEI and phone number, warranted search for the phone evidence, and Federal search through the acquired phone image. Presumably, the search through a forensically acquired phone would yield additional information, and reading between the lines I am guessing this was the case for the evidentiary Samsung phone. Certainly it would assist in authenticating the evidence.

Defendant Jaun Olaya, the owner of the phone and one of the group members charged, moved to suppress the results of all three searches.  Mr. Olaya argued that “even if the screenshots that Esparza obtained should not be suppressed, the results of the more comprehensive FBI search should be.” On 4/19/2017 the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division court agreed with Olaya: The FBI’s acquisition of the phone and subsequent search was found to be warrantless and a violation of Olaya’s 4th amendment.  Pages 14 through to the end of the Court’s opinion and order contain the Court’s reasoning on this point.

What would be interesting to me (and potentially to criminal defense attorneys) is whether the same logic of the court could be applied if officer Esparza HAD done a full forensic acquisition of Olaya’s phone: Under those conditions, would the government’s use of Esparza’s acquisition required a second warrant?  The fact is, there is a lot of data in a phone acquisition that has nothing to do with specific crimes so I am guessing that the argument could be made.  If any criminal attorneys know of some good cases to answer the question, feel free to post below!

 

United States v. Juan Olaya, D-2, Case No. 15-cr-20200, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

 

 


Texas CoA Addresses Electronic Community Property and Invasion of Privacy

August 5, 2016

Reference:

Miller v. Talley Dunn Gallery LLC, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2280

(Tex. App. – Dallas March 3, 2016) (mem. opinion)

(Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV)

Relevant Documents:

Memorandum Opinion:  March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV

Texas Penal Code 33

In this case, part of the original trial court’s decision determined that Talley Dunn and the Tally Dunn Gallery LLC had “established a probable right to recover on their claims under the HACA. [Harmful Access to Computers Act]”  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 19]

In his appeal, Bradley B. Miller argues that, while he admits that he took screenshots of information contained on the phone, the screenshots do not qualify as “access” and that he had effective consent to do so because the cell phone was community property.  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 21-22]

Texas Penal Code § 33.01(1) defines access as:

“to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, alter data or computer software in, or otherwise make use of any resource of a computer, computer network, computer program, or computer system.”

Neither party disputes that a cell phone is a computer, and the appellate court found that in order to take the screen shots Miller necessarily HAD to access the the computing device, within the definition of the penal code.  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 22]

Regarding his argument that he had effective consent to access the cell phone because it was community property, the CoA relied upon the penal code definition of ‘owner’ as:

“a person who:

(A) has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor;

(B) has the right to restrict access to the property; or

(C) is the licensee of data or computer software.”

Dunn used the cell phone on a daily basis, had the right to place a password on it (and had), and the court determined Dunn had a ‘greater right to possession of the cell phone’.[March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 23]  Further, the CoA notes earlier in the opinion that “[N]othing in the Texas Constitution or our common law suggests that the right of privacy is limited to unmarried individuals.”  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 20]

Interestingly, the court does not address the multiple licenses that are part of the software and operating system that users have to acknowledge and accept to use a modern cell phone.  I would expect that will start coming up as another layer to the definition of ‘owner’, though.

Accordingly, the CoA concludes that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining appellees established a probable right to recover on their claims under the HACA.”  [March 3, 2016, Cause No. 05-15-00444-CV, pg. 23]


Weekly Highlights: April 21, 2014

April 22, 2014

FRCP Rule 37(e) (Preservation) is Changing

On April 11th, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee approved a  revision to Rule 37(e) (the section covers failure to preserve Electronically Stored Information (ESI)).  The new draft reads, as follows:

“(e) FAILURE TO PRESERVE ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION. If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the information, and the information cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court may:

(1) Upon finding of prejudice to another party from loss of the information, order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice;

(2) Only upon a finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation,

(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;

(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or

(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.”

You’ll note that the existing Rule 37e language is nowhere to be found:

Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”

You can read the proposed changes on the US Courts site, here.

 Popular Legal Websites Affected by the Heartbleed Flaw

Robert Ambrogi’s blog, “LawSites” had a post listing sites, popular with attorneys, that were affected by Heartbleed.  You can view that site here.  If you don’t know what “Heartbleed” is, you will need to.  You can view the Inforensics Blog post, to catch up.

Box.com, and Dropbox.com were, according to Ambrogi’s research, affected by the flaw.  If you use these sites, it is a good time to review and change passwords.  Also, read the Inforensics Blog post on Password Re-use.

 

Changing Metadata Leads to Sanctions

You may have missed the following case.  Remember: It doesn’t take an expert to alter data, and attempt obfuscation, just some software from your local Best-Buy:

T & E Inc. v. Faulkner, 2014 WL 550596 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2014)

In this case, sanctions were sought for alleged manipulation of metadata, in an attempt to hide the existence of a computer that had not been produced.  A successful motion to compel the defendant to produce computers gave a specific timeline for production.  A forensic expert found evidence that, during the time given to produce, the opposing party created a new user profile on a computer, copied data to it, and used a commercial software to alter times on files in order to make the system appear as though it had been in use, in an effort to hide the “real” computer that had been in use.  Spoliation sanctions were awarded in the form of an adverse inference, and $27,000 dollars.

 


Open Source Intelligence (OSI) and Your Case

April 2, 2014

Open Source Intelligence (OSI or OSINT) is intelligence collected from sources that are available publicly.  Much of the information fed to the internet by users, collected by advertisers, or otherwise left behind during a person’s interaction with electronic systems (or with retailers and advertisers that store such information electronically and the resell it) can be identified through “deep-“, or “dark-“ web research.  OSI is important enough of a research methodology that many law enforcement agencies, especially Federal, have dedicated resources to OSINT analysis and gathering. 

In civil litigation OSI is an invaluable resource for:

  • Research of retained and opposing experts
  • Information regarding opposing attorneys
  • Witness and litigant information
  • Uncovering other emails, social site accounts, properties, activities, and repositories of information not disclosed

Consider a recent case that I was involved with: The opposing party had disclosed certain online accounts that contained relevant information regarding their corporate history, communications via web mail, and travel.  An OSI search revealed two alternate web mail addresses, as well as a connection with a competing firm, travel information (previously undisclosed), and some “known associates” that had information relevant to the case.  Metadata analysis of documents and photos contained on the newly discovered sites yielded even more information.  None of this information was contained on the hard drive submitted for inspection.

OSI, on the web, is broken down into two main categories: Direct indexed information, and Dark web (or Deep web) information.

Direct indexed information is the category most familiar to practically anyone that uses the web.  It is information that has been picked up and indexed by a search engine and, with the correct search techniques, can be narrowed down to particular people, places and things.  Indexed information typically ends up on the web through three different paths:

Deliberate – Deliberate information is information that is on the web because of the direct interaction of an entity with a web resource.  This could be information that is publicly available because of social sites, website registration, or signing on to public newsgroups and forums. 

Accidental (Through fault of the information Owner) – Often times information is deliberately provided, but the provider of the information didn’t realize that the information would be publicly searchable.  Facebook is a perfect example of where, by not understanding ALL the privacy implications of use, users (or their friends) often provide way more details, photos, or location information than is intended, desirable, or realized.

Accidental (Through fault of the information Custodian) – Very large data breaches are far too common these days.  The reality is that they have been very common for years and years, but focus has only recently been turned towards the size, and frequency of breaches.  Aside from breaches, however, “information leakage” is not at all uncommon.  Information leakage is where a website or internet resource unintentionally will provide more information than the user, or the owner, realize. There are teams of people, advertisers, and intelligence gathering entities that  look for information leak and harvest the results.

Dark (or Deep) Web information sounds very “techie” and mysterious, but in reality simply describes the large portions of the web that contain information that is not indexed by search engines.  Typically these are databases of information that are accessible from a website, registration information, attendance and membership databases and information of that nature.

The challenge with OSI is to compile information both from direct indexed resources and dark web resources, and then correlate and narrow the information so that it accurate to the particular entity that is being researched.  A thorough manual search can be performed using the “cheat sheets” provided with this book.  The challenge is that aggregation, correlation and verification can take many hours.  There are tools available to an attorney that speed up the process.  LexisNexis offers access to a static database through the Accurint tool (http://www.Accurint.com), and Westlaw (http://www.Westlaw.com) also provides static database information as well.  There are any number of smaller sites that offer various degrees of information through static databases. 

Static information can quickly become inaccurate or stale, and there are tools that fill the niche for automated research.  Vidoc Razor maintains such a tool (If you are an attorney, you can request a login at: http://www.vidocrazor.com/RSInfo.php) that actively mines “live” social information, media and publications, photos, as well as location and known relations and associate information.  The information is then aggregated, correlated, and a baseline validity check performed.  The information is available for filtering and refining from a single point, and custom reports can be generated.

Whether using manual techniques, static databases, or automated approaches, the nature of OSI is important to keep firmly in mind:  it is fluid.  The information “lives” and changes as people live and change.  It is also contradictory; some OSI is incredibly volatile and can “evaporate” without warning, while other OSI is incredibly persistent, and will stay available through harvesting techniques even when the information owner is actively trying to remove it.  Any information derived from any of the harvesting techniques discussed must be verified before action is taken on it.


Weekly Highlights: September 10, 2012

September 10, 2012

Things You Might Have Missed Last Week

(Highlights in legal and electronic discovery news for the past week)

Interesting Electronic Evidence Cases

Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00127-PK (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012)

The defendant was seeking to compel production of discovery in (among other things) “all social media content involving [Plaintiff] since July 1, 2008” related to the Plaintiff’s “‘emotion, feeling, or mental state,’ to ‘events that could be reasonably expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state,’ or to allegations in [Plaintiff’s] complaint.”.

Magistrate Judge Paul Papak (Oregon) found:

“I see no principled reason to articulate different standards for the discoverability of communications through email, text message, or social media platforms. I therefore fashion a single order covering all these communications.”

Link to Opinion PDF

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. C 11-1846 LHK (PSG) (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012)

The Defendant in this case was sanctioned for the loss of relevant emails due to Defendant’s failure to follow-up with employees to ensure compliance, and the Defendant’s failure to halt the email system’s auto-delete function.  Sanctions included an adverse inference that allowed the jury to presume that the missing evidence was relevant and favorable to the Plaintiff.

Link to Opinion PDF

Weekly Highlighted Case

EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430 (S.D. Ind. May 2010)

This case can be very useful when dealing with social media electronic evidence matters.  It was utilized by the Oregon magistrate in the above listed case (Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas) when forming his opinion.

The defendant in this matter was seeking production of claimants’ social networking site profiles, as well as other communications from social sites used by the claimant.

Last May, the Great State of Texas saw a similar matter that relied, in part, on the EEOC case:

IN RE MAGELLAN TERMINALS HOLDINGS, L.P. AND MAGELLAN MIDSTREAM HOLDINGS GP, LLC 
Link to PDF Document

Electronic Evidence News

State Bar of Texas Alert Says ‘Scam Artist’ Stole Nonpracticing Lawyer’s ID for Fake Website

West Let Off the Hook on Web Malpractice Claim

OJ Simpson Prosecutor: Johnnie Cochran May Have Tampered with Bloody Glove


A Simple Plan to Ruin Your Boss: Plant Child Porn On His PC

August 10, 2010

A simple plan to ruin your boss: plant child porn on his PC.

This occurred in the UK in 2006 (it is just now working its way through the courts), and seems extreme.  The reality is that planted evidence can occur in many different forms:  Planted documents, images, and even emails.

While the deception in the UK case was broken through cell phone activity (the perpetrator made an “anonymous” phone call, and had been heard bragging about his exploits at a BBQ), a good forensic examiner goes beyond simple modified, accessed and created times to review other system information that backs up the method of arrival of the information on the system itself:

  • The insertion of USB devices: USB devices can leave quite a trail on a system, including the device manufacturer, type, even sometimes serial numbers.  Further activity supporting the insertion of the device can sometimes be correlated between file history analysis and searches for activity surrounding the specific device ID.
  • Metadata contained within the purported documents: Images, videos, audio files, PDF documents and other file types often have information regarding the date of creation (not necessarily introduction to the system), authorship, serial or license numbers of the product used, sometimes even information about the system that created them.
  • System files: Sometimes the introduction or generation of a file triggers other supporting files on the system.  Examination of these files can tell an investigator whether the file information matches up with what the system knows about the file.
  • Surrounding activity: Other activity on the system related to usage can be an indicator as well.  For example: If a file was supposedly downloaded from the internet, one would expect to see certain other activity surrounding the download if it was generated by the user.

A lot of these same techniques can be used to attack or defend other claims of the so-called “trojan defense” (aka “A Virus must have done it”).

Researching deliberate obfuscation CAN be a challenge, but in situations similar to the UK case a client is not at all dead in the water if an information forensics analyst is competent and able to look at the “Evidence Beyond the Hard Drive”™.


Kwame Kilpatrick Asks Skytel for $100M

March 10, 2009

It is being reported that Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick is going after Skytel for the release of the text messages that led to the settlement of the police whistleblower lawsuit against him.

(source: The Detroit News)

It appears that the grounds for this action is the Stored Communications Act.  As a non-attorney I am guessing that this will boil down to a few factors:

  1. Was the police department involved in the production of the text messages (4th amendment),
  2. Was the contract with Skytel to provide messaging services, or storage/retrieval and reporting?

The Stored Communication Act does differentiate between a provider of services, and a provider of storage, so the Skytel contract wording will likely make a difference.

With all of the Kwame Drama aside, this could actually be interesting for providers, contract attorneys, e-discovery and forensics folks as well.

Here is a reference to another case with similar characteristics:

Quon v. Arch Wireless


The Fifth Amendment and Sebastien Boucher: Beyond Knee-Jerk Response

February 27, 2009

In December of 2006, Sebastien Boucher was crossing the US border when he was stopped and his laptop was reviewed by ICE officials.   The laptop was in his backseat and, according to documents, the drive containing the child pornography was accessible without requiring a password.

Mr. Boucher was Mirandized, but waived his rights and continued to talk to the agent.  During this conversation Mr. Boucher told the agent that he sometimes accidentally downloaded child pornography but would then delete the files when he realized what they were.  The agent requested that Mr. Boucher show him where he stored the files that he downloaded and Mr. Boucher directed him to a drive “Z”.

The agent continued to search the laptop and found several more instances of child pornography.  Mr. Boucher was subsequently arrested and the laptop seized (it was shutdown).

Nine days later a forensic bit image was made of the drive and the drive “Z” was found to be encrypted by PGP, and the content unaccessible without the encryption key which, curiously enough, Mr. Boucher has refused to turn over.

In November 2007 Judge Jerome J. Niedermeier granted Sebastien Boucher’s motion to quash the subpoena directing him to turn over his encryption key for the drive, citing his fifth amendment rights.

An appeal was filed and U.S. District Judge William Sessions in Vermont ruled this week that Mr. Boucher does not have a fifth amendment right to keep the files encrypted.

What motivates me most to write about this case is the knee-jerk response that will surely follow by those that only read news releases and not the actual filings in the case.  Both judges have raised some fascinating issues regarding the fifth amendment and this specific case, and both the granting of the motion to quash and the subsequent reversal hinged on specific facts in this case, and NOT a blanket decision as some blogs will have you believe.

Judge Niedermeier weighed issues regarding compulsion to testify (subpoena) and the various components that make up a valid fifth amendment argument. In pondering these points the judge notes:

Both parties agree that the contents of the laptop do not enjoy Fifth Amendment
protection as the contents were voluntarily prepared and are not testimonial. See id. at 409-10 (holding previously created work documents not privileged under the Fifth Amendment). Also, the government concedes that it cannot compel Boucher to disclose the password to the grand jury because the disclosure would be testimonial. The question remains whether entry of the password, giving the government access to drive Z, would be testimonial and therefore privileged.

The state evidently agreed to “not use the production of the password against Boucher.”  In so doing the state felt it would remove the testimonial aspect of entering the password.  Judge Niedermeier rejected this outright, citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).

In rejecting further arguments, Judge Niedermeier pointed out that the password was something in Boucher’s mind, and further stated:

This information is unlike a document, to which the foregone conclusion doctrine usually applies, and unlike any physical evidence the government could already know of. It is pure testimonial production rather than physical evidence having testimonial aspects. Compelling Boucher to produce the password compels him to display the contents of his mind to incriminate himself.

In his reversal, Judge Sessions notes that neither side questions the fact that “the contents of the laptop were voluntarily prepared or compiled and are not testimonial, and therefore do not enjoy Fifth Amendment protection.”, but notes that the root of the issue is the production of the password that in effect causes the accused to “‘disclose the contents of his own mind’”.

He also mentions the “compelling” aspect of the subpoena and notes that there are two scenarios under which the act of production in response to a subpoena may communicate incriminating facts:

(1) ‘if the existence and location of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government’; or (2) where production would ‘implicitly authenticate’ the documents.” Id. (quoting United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983)).

Drawing from this the judge concludes that because Boucher already let the Government see the drive and the contents (unencrypted) and because the Government does not require Boucher’s production of the unencrypted drive to link him to the files on his computer, then the production is not considered incriminating and so the fifth amendment protection is not valid.

I have to say that without reading the opinions I would assume that because Mr. Boucher was Mirandized, willingly volunteered information regarding the existence and contents of the drive (prior to shutdown and encryption) and willingly allowed a Government agent to browse his drive I would have assumed that he had rung a bell that could not be unrung.

[  Copies of the opinions will be uploaded soon]



Subpoena Duces Tecum – Or Not?

January 13, 2009

Any expert that has had to respond to a subpoena duces tecum is likely to find this interesting.  I am not convinced as an expert that I would like to push this line, though.  Thoughts?

——————————————————————————————————————————————

In re Teleglobe Communications Corp., 2008
Category – Production, Spoliation
WL 3198875
( Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 7, 2008 )

Background:  Defendants’ motion to exclude testimony of the plaintiff’s expert as a sanction for the alleged spoliation of information considered in forming their opinions is denied.  The court found that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) does not require the plaintiffs’ experts produce all drafts of their reports.

In addition, the court rejected the notion that draft reports fall into the category of data or information “considered” by the expert, which must be produced:

“The expert does not really ‘consider’ prior drafts in forming his opinion; the prior drafts are simply preliminary iterations of his opinion.  Rather than ‘consider’ his prior thoughts and statements, in editing the report the expert is considering the underlying data which forms the basis of the revisions.”

The court recognized that the Plaintiff’s experts did not destroy any documents, they simply made corrections to their reports and failed to save the drafts.